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Blockholder disclosure thresholds shape incentives for hedge fund activism, which
are jointly determined with real investment and managerial behavior. Uninformed in-
vestors value lower thresholds (greater transparency) when the cost of trading against
an informed activist outweighs the benefits of the activist’s disciplining of management.
Conversely, activists may desire disclosure thresholds if their threat of participation dis-
courages managerial malfeasance, which is their source of profits. Hedge fund activism
can be excessive: if market opacity sufficiently harms uninformed investors, the costs
of reduced real investment outweigh the social benefits from managerial disciplining,
and society benefits from lower thresholds.
Keywords: Hedge fund activism, blockholder disclosure thresholds, informed trad-
ing, investor activism.
JEL codes: G34, G14, G18, K22.
∗We thank Marc Arnold, Pablo Beker, Costas Cavounidis, Dragana Cvijanović, Amil Dasgupta, Tao
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1 Introduction
Hedge fund activism mitigates agency problems that affect governance in publicly-traded
companies with dispersed owners (Brav et al. 2008; Bebchuk et al. 2015). However, their
business models and the relatively short-term nature of their strategies often generate contro-
versy.1 Activist hedge funds are, by their nature, informed traders that profit from trading
on their information advantages at the expense of uninformed shareholders. As a result,
activists may discourage investment, destroying value (Leland 1992; Bernhardt et al. 1995).
Blockholder disclosure thresholds can limit the trading profits of activist funds, but this, in
turn, affects their incentives to discipline management, and thus managerial behavior. Our
paper analyzes how disclosure thresholds determine hedge fund activism, managerial behav-
ior and the initial capital investment by dispersed uninformed investors, i.e., real investment.
We derive the optimal policies from the perspectives of investors, activist funds, and society.
Highlighting the issues, in 2011, partners at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz (WLRK),
a prominent law firm specializing in corporate and securities law, submitted a petition to
the SEC advocating that rules governing the disclosure of blocks of stock in publicly-traded
companies be tightened. WLRK argued that the current disclosure threshold allows activist
investors to secretly accumulate enough stock to create fundamental changes, and they only
hold positions for brief periods of time (Brav et al. 2010; Becht et al. 2017). This, WLRK
claimed, damages market transparency and investor confidence. Academics responded, argu-
ing that tighter disclosure rules would discourage activists by reducing their ability to profit
from stock purchases that do not yet reflect the value of their actions (Bebchuk and Jackson
2012; Bebchuk et al. 2013). This, they argued, would harm small investors, who would then
not glean the value-enhancing benefits of hedge fund activism on corporate behavior.
We identify the key forces in the debate about optimal blockholder disclosure thresholds
in the presence of activist hedge funds, and study their interplay. Our model reveals how
disclosure thresholds affect (i) the incentives of activist funds to engage in costly managerial
1Brav et al. (2010) find a median duration from disclosure to divestment of 266 days.
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disciplining; (ii) the real investment of small uninformed investors; and (iii) the choices by
managers of whether to pursue potentially value-destroying activities. Our analysis sheds
light on when and how the interests of uninformed investors and activist funds conflict, and
where a welfare-maximizing regulator stands.
The driving mechanisms are complex. Uninformed investors benefit from the disciplining
effect of hedge fund activism, but incur costs when trading with activists that are privately
informed about their own value-enhancing potential. At the other end, activist funds profit
from acquiring undervalued stock when their participation has not been revealed; but can be
hurt if their trading profits, which represent trading losses for uninformed investors, reduce
real investment, or if the possibility of their intervention deters managerial malfeasance.
We show that activists never benefit from a disclosure threshold solely because it boosts
real investment, but that they can gain from tighter thresholds that reduce their incentives to
intervene, thereby raising the likelihood that managers pursue their own interests at the ex-
pense of their firms. We find that, depending on how disclosure thresholds affect managerial
actions, either uninformed investors or activist funds may value tighter disclosure thresh-
olds, but that socially-optimal thresholds always lie weakly between their preferred thresh-
olds. This reflects that society does not internalize trading transfers between uninformed
investors and activist funds, but it does care about real investment and managerial discipline.
Our base formulation features a continuum of small investors who invest in a project
with decreasing returns. The firm’s management can obtain private benefits by taking a
value-destroying action. Should management do this, it may be observed by a large activist
fund that is external to the firm, which can then engage in a costly intervention that disci-
plines management and restores project value. The fund’s incentives to incur these costs are
provided by the opportunity to secretly acquire stock of the company before its price reflects
the value of its intervention. The activist’s sole source of rents is the increase in stock value
due to intervention relative to the acquisition price.
The activist endogenously determines how many shares to acquire. In our static deal-
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ership model, a competitive market maker posts prices conditional on the net order flow.
Then the activist trades along with a random measure of shareholders (initial investors) who
receive liquidity shocks that force them to sell their shares. The activist’s order trades off the
benefits of a larger block size and the costs of the information revealed. Liquidity trade is
drawn from an exponential distribution. This structure allows us to solve for informed trade
and its price impacts in closed form (Edmans 2009), and hence how disclosure thresholds
affect an activist’s ex-ante expected trading profits, prior to an intervention decision.
A disclosure threshold limits the equity position that can be secretly acquired. Crossing
the threshold reveals the activist’s position to the market maker, who then updates prices,
eliminating any trading rents of the activist. As a result, in equilibrium, the activist’s posi-
tion does not cross the disclosure threshold and the policy becomes an upper bound on its
position and hence trading profits. Lower profits from trading reduce the activist’s incentives
to intervene. Importantly, the expected levels of activism, and thus of managerial discipline,
determine the profitability of real investment by uninformed investors. In turn, this real
investment affects the value of intervention, creating a feedback effect on the incentives of
activists to participate. The optimal disclosure threshold policy for each party reflects the
tensions each faces with regard to the preferred level of market transparency.
Consider the tradeoffs for uninformed investors. Higher transparency (a lower disclosure
threshold) reduces their trading losses, but it also reduces the willingness of hedge fund
activists to intervene. In turn, this encourages management to pursue its own interests at
the expense of shareholders. Uninformed investors value lower disclosure thresholds when
the expected trading losses saved outweigh the benefit of free riding on the activist’s costly
managerial disciplining. They gain from the reduced shares that activists acquire when those
shares are not needed to induce activism, but are harmed when the share limit discourages
activism. Their optimal disclosure threshold trades these considerations off.
Now consider the firm’s management. The manager can take a value-destroying action to
obtain private benefits, but incurs a reputation cost if disciplined by the activist. Improve-
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ments in the performance and governance achieved by activists often come at the expense
of managers and directors who see sharp reductions in compensation and a higher likelihood
of replacement (Brav et al. 2010; Fos and Tsoutsoura 2014). This threat of being disci-
plined by activists improves managerial performance (Gantchev et al. 2019). We capture
this mechanism, recognizing the ex-ante disciplining role of activists in discouraging man-
agerial malfeasance. Since higher trading transfers make an activist more willing to act if
management misbehaves, they also induce better behavior by management.
This managerial feedback benefits uninformed investors, but, paradoxically, by reduc-
ing the likelihood of managerial misbehavior, it reduces an activist’s opportunities to profit
from its business of disciplining management. When managers are sensitive to threats of
activism, uninformed shareholders want to raise disclosure thresholds, as they only real-
ize trading losses when an activist intervenes. Raising disclosure thresholds both increase
activists’ intervention rates (ex-post disciplining) and discourage malfeasance (ex-ante disci-
plining). The same mechanism represents a tension for the activist, which trades off higher
conditional trading profits against a lower probability of profiting. We show that whenever
activists value a disclosure threshold, uninformed investors want greater activism, indeed
preferring no threshold at all. Shareholders gain from an activist’s willingness to act with-
out having to pay any trading costs. In effect, an activist’s willingness to act discourages
excessively—from its perspective, but not shareholders—management’s desire to pursue its
own interests at the expense of shareholders.
The final tension reflects that the activist’s trading profits depend on the value of in-
tervention, which reflects the scale of real investment: value-enhancing actions in larger
companies have bigger impacts. When the trading losses of initial investors are large relative
to the benefits of managerial disciplining, activism reduces real investment and hence the
value of the activist’s intervention. The activist does not internalize this investment feedback
effect in its trading because initial investment has already been sunk. A disclosure thresh-
old can serve as a commitment device for an activist to limit its trade, thereby raising real
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investment. Surprisingly, we establish the activist never benefits from a disclosure threshold
just because it boosts real investment: we prove that investment feedback is a second-order
effect relative to trading transfers. For the activist, the benefits of increased trading on its
information advantage always outweigh the cost of any reductions in real investment.
The negative effect of market opacity on real investment captures the concerns of the
Williams Act (1968), which introduced disclosure thresholds. They were designed to “alert
investors in securities markets to potential changes in corporate control and to provide them
with an opportunity to evaluate the effect of these potential changes.”2 Uncertainty over
managerial behavior and activist trade translate into stock price discounts that benefit ac-
tivist funds. Trading is a zero-sum game in which expected activist profits represent expected
losses to uninformed investors (incurred by initial investors, even if they sold previously to
new uninformed traders). When these losses outweigh the benefits of monitoring, hedge fund
activism harms the initial investors, causing them to reduce investment. Conversely, activism
fosters investment when it benefits uninformed investors. By regulating trading transfers,
disclosure thresholds affect real investment. This link between market efficiency and eco-
nomic efficiency was first made in Bernhardt et al. (1995) in the context of insider trading.
Here, we focus on the interplay between corporate governance and real investment. We iden-
tify twin real effects of informed trade by hedge fund activists: (i) it encourages activists to
create value by intervening in underperforming companies, and (ii) it affects real investment.
We characterize the socially-optimal disclosure threshold and show that it coincides with
the preferred policies of uninformed investors and activists only if they all prefer not to have
a binding threshold. Society (a regulator) does not internalize the transfer of trading profits
from uninformed investors to the activist, caring only about the gross expected value of the
firm net of the costs of capital and activism, i.e., caring only about the indirect real effects
of trading in financial markets. We show that the socially-optimal disclosure threshold is
2Quote of the case resolution Wellman v. Dickinson, 682 F.2d 355, 365-66 (2d. Cir. 1982), citing GAF
Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 717 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972). Used in “Section
13(d) Reporting Requirements Need Updating” by David A. Katz of WLRK in Harvard Law School Forum
on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, 2012.
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always weakly between the thresholds preferred by shareholders and the activist hedge fund.
Practically, our analysis provides guidance to regulators considering revisions to ownership
disclosure rules. The multiple considerations entering optimal disclosure thresholds suggest
the merits of a tailored policy approach that accounts for market and firm characteristics.
Our base model assumes that an activist only takes positions if it observes management
pursuing value-destroying actions, acting whenever expected trading profits outweigh the
cost of intervention. Gantchev (2013) finds intervention costs to be sizable. This leads us to
consider how outcomes are affected when activists can sometimes engage in stock-picking,
profiting from trading on information that management is working to maximize shareholder
value, in which case they need not incur costs of intervention. In practice, stock-picking rep-
resents a major source of activist profits (Cremers et al. 2020; Feng et al. 2020). We show that
such stock-picking has positive spillover effects on disciplining management: stock-picking
based on good news raises the likelihood that negative net order flows do not contain activist
trade, resulting in lower stock prices that make activism more profitable. This result con-
tributes to the debate on value creation by activist funds,3 showing that their stock-picking
may, in fact, increase profits from disciplining management, improving corporate governance.
Our paper contributes to a long-standing formal literature of governance through voice
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Maug, 1998; Kahn and Winton, 1998), and the more recent focus
on activist funds (Burkart and Lee, 2018; Brav et al., 2019; Corum and Levit, 2018; Edmans
et al., 2019; Burkart and Dasgupta, 2020). Our analysis recognizes the role of financial mar-
kets on the incentives of activists to take positions in a target company and intervene. Back
et al. (2018) shares this property. They characterize the dynamic trading by an activist in-
vestor, showing how the intervention cost function affects outcomes. We simplify the trading
process (static) and the cost of intervention (fixed) in order to endogenize firm value in terms
of real investment and managerial behavior, and to study the role of market transparency.
3See the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation posts “The
Long-term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism: A Reply to Cremers, Giambona, Sepe, and Wang” by L.
Bebchuk, A. Brav, W. Jiang, and T. Keusch on Dec. 10, 2015; and “Reply” by M. Cremers, E. Giambona,
S. Sepe, and Y. Wang on Dec. 19, 2015.
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The relation between market transparency and real investment is close to seminal papers in
the insider trading literature (Leland, 1992; Bernhardt et al., 1995).
Despite the long-term value of hedge fund activism (Brav et al. 2015; Bebchuk et al. 2015),
researchers have found that activist funds have short investment horizons (Brav et al. 2008,
2010; Boyson and Mooradian 2011), and that they acquire stock after targeting a firm (Be-
bchuk et al. 2013). Share prices typically rise sharply when an activist’s presence is revealed
because the market anticipates their intervention, and Bebchuk et al. (2015) finds that these
post-disclosure spikes in share prices reflect the long-term value of intervention. The main
source of rents for activist funds is the price increase caused by their own interventions on the
shares acquired prior to revealing themselves (Bebchuk and Jackson 2012; Becht et al. 2017).
Our modelling assumptions are motivated by findings in the empirical literature on hedge
fund activism. These findings include: a positive relation between liquidity and hedge
fund activism (Collin-Dufresne and Fos, 2015; Gantchev and Jotikasthira, 2017), the value-
enhancing nature of interventions by activist funds (Brav et al., 2008; Clifford, 2008; Klein
and Zur, 2009; Boyson and Mooradian, 2011; Brav et al., 2015; Bebchuk et al., 2015), and
the costs of interventions for activists (Gantchev, 2013) and managers in target companies
(Brav et al., 2010; Fos and Tsoutsoura, 2014). La Porta et al. (2006) and Djankov et al.
(2008) document evidence of the positive relationship between investor protection and cap-
ital formation. Several of our predictions have empirical support, including the extent of
the price reaction to the disclosure of an activist fund (Bebchuk et al. 2015), that disclosure
thresholds constrain funds’ positions (Bebchuk et al. 2013), and that managers react to the
threat of activism (Gantchev et al. 2019; Feng et al. 2020).
Section 2 builds our model of hedge fund activism. Section 3 introduces blockholder
disclosure thresholds and derives optimal policies. Section 4 adds stock-picking by funds.
Section 5 discusses the applicability of our results, and possible tests of additional predic-
tions. A conclusion follows. An appendix contains all proofs.
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2 Hedge Fund Activism
In this section we model hedge fund activism and characterize its inter-linkages with corpo-
rate management and real investment. We consider a firm that raises capital for a project
whose value depends on the initial investment by uninformed investors and a business plan
that may be either good or bad. The manager can deliberately adopt the bad business plan
in order to obtain private rents at the expense of shareholders. The bad plan reduces value
for shareholders unless an outside activist hedge fund intervenes to discipline management
and implement the good plan. All agents are risk neutral. There are four dates, t = 0, 1, 2, 3.
There is no discounting.
At date t = 0, a continuum of dispersed investors choose capital investment k in a project
with an expected date t = 3 payoff of
V = f(k)
[
1− δ · 1{m=0}
]
. (1)
Here, f is a standard production technology with f ′ (·) > 0, f ′′ (·) < 0, f ′ (0) → ∞. The
indicator function accounts for the business plan m ∈ {0, 1} implemented by the manager
at t = 1. The good plan (m = 1) yields cash flows f(k) to investors. The bad plan (m = 0)
yields nothing with probability δ ∈ [0, 1]. Equivalently, the bad plan destroys a fraction δ of
the project’s value. Investors are uninformed, unable to distinguish between good and bad
business plans. The marginal cost of capital is r > 0. Initial investors become shareholders
who receive claims to terminal project payoffs that they may trade in a market at t = 2. We
normalize shares outstanding to have measure one.
At t = 1, the manager adopts the business plan. If the manager implements the good
plan (m = 1), she receives a payoff that is normalized to zero at t = 3. If, instead, the
manager adopts the bad plan (m = 0), her payoff depends on whether she is subsequently
disciplined by the activist hedge fund. If the activist does not intervene, adopting the bad
business plan gives the manager a fixed benefit ϕ. If the activist disciplines the manager,
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she does not receive the private benefit and incurs a privately-observed reputation cost ρ.
Other market agents share a common prior that ρ is distributed over [0, R] according to a
strictly positive density h and associated cumulative function H, with ϕ < R.
At t = 2, initial investors receive liquidity shocks and must sell their stock in a compet-
itive dealership market. These investors place orders to sell a fraction l of stock, where l is
exponentially distributed with density
y(l) =
 µe
−µl if l ≥ 0
0 if l < 0.
(2)
Parameter µ > 1 captures market liquidity, with larger values of µ representing more illiquid
markets. On average, liquidity sales represent a proportion 1
µ
of the stock.4 An activist,
who is an outsider to the firm, may also be present in the market. The activist identifies
managerial malfeasance (business plan m = 0) when it occurs with probability λ < 1. The
activist can discipline management at a cost c, forcing the firm to shift from the bad business
plan to the good one. The activist privately observes his cost of activism. Other market
agents share a common prior that c is distributed on [0, C] according to a strictly positive
and weakly decreasing density g and associated cumulative distribution G. The activist
acquires a fraction α of the company’s shares, which we term his position, trading at the
same time as investors receiving liquidity shocks. A competitive market maker observes the
net order flow ω = α− l from the activist and initial investors, but not its components, and
sets a price that equals expected project payoffs given ω, i.e., the market maker breaks even
in expectation, as in Kyle (1985).
To ease presentation, we assume that the activist cannot trade on private information
that the manager maximized shareholder value (choosing m = 1). That is, we assume that
the activist can only intervene if m = 0. Section 4 relaxes this assumption and discusses the
4Analysis is qualitatively unchanged if initial investors sell fraction γl of shares, where γ ∈ (0, 1) explicitly
measures the scale of liquidity shocks relative to firm size.
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implications of possible stock-picking by the activist fund. For simplicity, we also assume
that if an activist takes a position after management misbehaves (takes action m = 0) then
he disciplines management; i.e., he does not “cut-and-run” by selling shares before engaging
with management. Cutting and running becomes unattractive when it impairs the reputation
of activist funds, which Johnson and Swem (2020) find to be important for their profitability.
At t = 3, the project delivers cash flows f(k) if the manager implemented the good plan
or if the activist disciplines the manager. Otherwise, the expected cash flows are (1− δ) f(k).
The manager receives a payoff of zero from adopting the good business plan, and a payoff
from adopting the bad plan of ϕ or −ρ depending on whether or not the activist intervenes.






m ∈ {0, 1}
t = 1
Liquidity traders sell l ∼ exp(µ).
If the activist observes m = 0, he
may acquire α and incur cost c to
implement m = 1.
The market maker observes ω =






Figure 1: Time line
The parameter δ represents the value destroyed by the bad business plan in expecta-
tion; while ϕ represents the private benefits from managerial malfeasance that determine
the manager’s incentives to implement the bad plan. These parameters capture the severity
of the agency problem between management and ownership. If δ = 0, both business plans
yield cash flows f(k), so there are no frictions between investors and the manager, and thus
no room for managerial disciplining; and if ϕ = 0, the manager always implements the good
business plan. In contrast, δ > 0 together with ϕ > 0 imply that the manager may destroy
shareholder value to obtain private benefits, creating a potential role for hedge fund activism.
Both the manager’s private benefits from malfeasance ϕ and the reputation costs of being
disciplined by an activist ρ allow for multiple interpretations. For instance, managerial ben-
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efits from acting against shareholders might be related to increasing executive compensation
or empire-building mergers and acquisitions. The costs of being disciplined by an activist in-
clude the consequences for career prospects. For example, Fos and Tsoutsoura (2014) report
that facing a direct threat of removal is associated with $1.3-$2.9 million in foregone income
until retirement for the median incumbent director in their sample; and Keusch (2017) finds
that in the year after activists intervene, internal CEO turnover rises 7.4%.
Parameter λ captures the ease with which activist funds can identify malfeasance, for
example the visibility of such behavior to activists. For instance, Gantchev et al. (2019)
find evidence that industry peers of firms targeted by activists have increased perceptions
of their exposure to activism, i.e., a higher λ, reflecting that once a form of malfeasance is
uncovered, activists know what to look for in peer firms.
We assume that when the activist correctly identifies the bad business plan, he can disci-
pline management with certainty, and that he buys shares in the target company at a single
time where shareholders (investors) face liquidity shocks. In practice, these processes are
dynamic (Collin-Dufresne and Fos 2015; Back et al. 2018), with uncertain costs (Gantchev
2013) and outcomes (Becht et al. 2017). We abstract from these mechanics to study the
incentives provided by financial markets. What matters for our analysis are the expectations
that an activist forms about these costs and outcomes at t = 2 when deciding whether to try
to discipline management. The decision is based on the balance between expected financial
benefits and engagement costs, and the likely dynamic price impacts of trading—and not
the particular paths that can be realized given a decision to move forward. In our setting,
the cost of activism c is orthogonal to initial investment. This reflects the increasing returns
of activism with respect to firm size on a reduced form that keeps our model tractable.
2.1 Market Equilibrium
We solve recursively for the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium. At t = 2, real investment has
been sunk by uninformed investors and is observable to all parties, the manager adopted a
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business plan, and the activist observes malfeasance with probability λ. Uninformed investors
receive liquidity shocks and trade simultaneously with the activist in the dealership market
with pricing by the risk neutral market maker. At t = 1 the manager adopts the plan m ∈
{0, 1} that maximizes her expected private benefits given the expectation that the activist in-
tervenes. At t = 0 uninformed investors invest capital, anticipating these subsequent events.
2.1.1 Trading
We begin by deriving the Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the trading subgame at date 2. The
activist participation and trade is optimal given the market maker’s pricing function, and
the market maker’s pricing function earns it zero expected profits given the activist’s deci-
sions. We use z to denote the endogenous probability of managerial malfeasance, which we
characterize in the next section. Proposition 1 summarizes the details:
Proposition 1 Suppose that at t = 0 investors made investment k, and that it is common
knowledge that the manager adopted the bad business plan (m = 0) with probability z at





and disciplines management if he observes managerial malfeasance and the cost of activism
is sufficiently small, c ≤ c∗t , where





1− zλG(c∗t )Y (α∗)
]
δf(k). (4)
Otherwise the activist does not participate.





1−zλG(c∗t )Y (α∗)−z(1−λG(c∗t ))δ
1−zλG(c∗t )Y (α∗)
]
f(k) if ω ≤ 0
Ph ≡ f(k) if ω > 0
. (5)
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A proof is in the Appendix; here we provide the key intuition. After observing the net
order flow, the market maker updates beliefs according to Bayes Rule and sets prices in (5).
A net buy order, ω > 0, reveals with probability one that the activist took a position, in
which case the project is sure to pay f(k). In contrast, (weakly) net sell orders, ω ≤ 0, are
consistent with both the presence and absence of activism, and allow the activist to extract
information rents from uninformed investors. Conditional on the activist acquiring a position
α when participating, the expected value of the project when there is a net sale of stock is
Pl(α) =
[




When the activist participates and liquidity shocks outweigh the number of shares that he
buys, i.e., when l ≥ α, there is a net supply of shares and the activist acquires the stock below
its true value at Pl < f (k). If, instead, l < α, then there is a net demand for stock and the ac-
tivist pays Ph, making no profit. The probability that the activist camouflages his share pur-
chase with liquidity sales is
∫∞
α
y(l)dl = 1−Y (α). Letting a1 denote activism and a0 denote
the absence of activism, the activist’s expected gross profits from acquiring a position α are:
E[ΠA|a1] = [1− Y (α)]α [f(k)− Pl] . (7)
Inspection of (7) reveals that the activist faces a trade-off between the volume of stock
acquired α and the expected cost of information revelation 1 − Y (α). This captures the
adverse price effects by which the expected stock price paid by the activist rises as he buys
more shares. The activist’s expected trading profits in (7) are maximized by an equity po-
sition α∗ = 1/µ; in equilibrium the market maker sets Pl in (5) to reflect α = α
∗. Greater
liquidity, i.e., smaller µ, makes it easier for the activist to camouflage his trade, encouraging
him to acquire a bigger position.
If the activist observes managerial malfeasance, he disciplines management when he ex-
pects it to be profitable, i.e., when E[ΠA|a1] ≥ c. This relation together with the market
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maker’s price policy Pl(α) pin down the activist’s cost participation cutoff in equilibrium:






which takes the form in (4) when evaluated at the optimal order α∗ = 1/µ, i.e., c∗t ≡ ct(α∗).
To see that equation (8) only has one solution observe that the right-hand side decreases in
ct, implying that the equilibrium cutoff c
∗
t is unique. In equilibrium, the activist employs a
threshold strategy such that, conditional on observing malfeasance, he takes a position α∗
and disciplines management if and only if c ≤ c∗t .
The cutoff c∗t captures two key equilibrium features. First, it represents the activist’s
participation threshold, and thus the extent of managerial disciplining. The probability that
the activist intervenes to discipline the manager after observing the manager taking an ac-
tion that reduces shareholder value is G (c∗t ). Thus, a higher c
∗
t implies superior governance.
Second, c∗t captures the activist’s expected conditional trading profits. In equilibrium, the
activist’s expected trading profits equal the expected trading losses of uninformed investors
because trading is a zero-sum game in which the market maker expects to break even. Thus,
c∗t represents the expected transfer of trading profits from uninformed investors to the activist
conditional on the activist intervening.
Conditional trading transfers c∗t increase with real investment k and with market liquidity
µ−1.5 The positive effect of investment on trading transfers reflects that the greater is
the project value, the more valuable is managerial disciplining, and the more profitable it
is for the activist to intervene. This follows because the cost of activism does not grow
proportionally with the company’s value, so the incentives for disciplining are positively
related to stock ownership (Shleifer and Vishny 1986). The positive impact of liquidity
on trading profits is a standard feature in settings with informed trading. Higher liquidity
reduces information revelation to the market, which allows the activist to increase his position
at a reduced risk of discovery (Kahn and Winton 1998; Maug 1998).
5To verify this, use the Implicit Function Theorem in (4) and note that Y (α∗) = 1− e−1.
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2.1.2 Management
At t = 1 the manager anticipates that if she adopts the bad business plan, then the ac-
tivist will intervene to discipline her actions with probability λG(ct). The manager privately
observes her reputation cost of discipline ρ and adopts the bad business plan only when
it is expected to be profitable. That is, managerial malfeasance occurs when the expected
private benefits from actions that destroy shareholder value (weakly) outweigh the expected
cost of being disciplined by an activist fund: [1 − λG (ct)]ϕ ≥ λG (ct)ρ. It follows that the
manager employs a threshold strategy, implementing the bad business plan if and only if the











t ), and the
characterization of the trading game in Proposition 1 follows directly by setting z ≡ H(ρ∗t ).
The solution for ρt reveals that malfeasance declines with the conditional probability of
activism G(ct): the more likely the activist is to participate after observing malfeasance, the
less likely is the manager to misbehave. We call the managers’ response to the threat of
activism the managerial feedback effect. The effect of activism is negative, reflecting that the
threat of activism deters managers from destroying shareholder value. Activism disciplines
management via two complementary channels: (i) ex post, the activist intervenes to change
the business plan when it is bad; (ii) ex ante, it discourages the adoption of the bad plan.
2.1.3 Investment
At t = 0, uninformed investors anticipate trading outcomes and activism levels, and invest
capital so as to maximize expected profits. In addition to the investment decision, Propo-
sition 2 below characterizes expected project payoffs and how they are split among market
participants in expectation at t = 0. This sets the stage for the analysis of the key interacting
15
forces in the model and the introduction of blockholder disclosure thresholds.
Proposition 2 The expected value at t = 0 of the project given investment k is








f(k) ≡ πV f(k). (10)








f(k) ≡ πAf(k). (11)
The expected gross profits of uninformed investors are:
E[ΠI ] = (πV − πA)f(k) ≡ πIf(k). (12)
The investment k by uninformed investors solves
πIf
′ (k)− r = 0. (13)
Total expected cash flows are the product of f(k) and the probability πV ∈ [0, 1] that the
project succeeds. Proposition 2 reveals that expected total rents are split between the ac-
tivist and uninformed investors in proportions πA/πV and πI/πV respectively. This follows
because the market maker earns zero expected profits, which means that activist trading
profits are extracted one-for-one from uninformed investors. The expected gross profits of
the activist equal the product of the unconditional probability H(ρ∗t )λG(c
∗
t ) that he partic-
ipates and the expected trading profits c∗t from participating. Uninformed investors obtain,
in expectation, the rest of the “pie”, (πV − πA) f(k). Real investment, characterized by (13),
maximizes the ex-ante expected profits of uninformed investors at date 0.
Proposition 2 shows that activism impacts real investment via its effect on the expected
profits of uninformed investors. Investors face a tension as to their preferred extent of ac-
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tivism. Higher trading transfers c∗t both incentivize activist participation to discipline man-
agement and deter malfeasance, i.e., increase G(c∗t ) and reduce H(ρ
∗
t ), potentially increasing
the expected share πA of cash flows taken by the activist, which reduces the investors’ share
πI . However, the better governance that follows from increased transfers of trading profits
also raises total expected cash flows of the project πV f(k). As a result, greater trading
transfers c∗t to activists need not hurt uninformed investors. In particular, activism fosters
real investment when investor gains from managerial disciplining outweigh the associated
trading losses, and it discourages real investment otherwise.
This mechanism underscores the investment feedback effect faced by the activist. The
value of activism is directly related to the size of the project—the profitability of the activist
grows with real investment, i.e., c∗t grows with k. But, expected levels of activism affect
investment. Therefore, expected activism affects real investment, which, in turn, affects the
extent of activism. Crucially, the activist does not internalize this investment feedback in
his trading decision at t = 2, because real investment has already been sunk. Thus, when
the activist participates, he takes a position α∗ that maximizes conditional expected profits
(7), i.e., for a given k, rather than unconditional expected profits (11).
3 Blockholder Disclosure Thresholds
Blockholder disclosure thresholds require a shareholder to disclose stock holdings once they
reach a certain fraction of the overall voting rights in a publicly-traded firm. In recent
years, hedge fund activism has led some market participants and commentators to call for
an expansion of these rules. However these petitions have often been met with opposition by
academics and institutional investors. The model developed in Section 2 captures the key
tensions faced by proponents in the two sides of the debate. We use this model to derive the
optimal disclosure threshold policies for uninformed investors, activist funds and society.
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3.1 The conditional impact
Ownership disclosure rules limit the number of undervalued shares that an activist can ac-
quire, potentially reducing his incentives to participate. If a legal disclosure threshold α is
implemented, an activist must publicly announce his position when it crosses the threshold.
Then the activist has no incentive to establish a larger position because doing so would
reveal his presence causing the stock price to rise to Ph = f(k), which would eliminate his
information rents, rendering intervention unprofitable. Corollary 3 follows:
Corollary 3 A disclosure threshold α is binding if and only if α < α∗. In equilibrium, when
a disclosure threshold binds the activist sets α = α.
The activist’s conditional trading profits ct(α), characterized by (8), increase with his po-
sition for α < α∗. Thus, when the activist participates, he acquires position α = min {α, α∗}.
It follows that a binding threshold necessarily reduces both the profits and extent of hedge
fund activism given a firm characterized by f(k) when the activist observed managerial
malfeasance. To see this, let ct ≡ ct(α) represent the trading profits, and hence participation
cutoff, associated with a position determined by a binding threshold α < α∗. Because trad-
ing profits increase in α, activism is now less profitable, i.e., ct < c
∗
t , reducing the conditional
probability that the activist participates to G (ct) < G (c
∗
t ). A direct consequence is that
managerial malfeasance is more likely to destroy value. This mechanism is consistent with
arguments against expanding ownership disclosure rules. However, our paper shows that
they only comprise part of the overall effect.
In particular, the argument is incomplete because it neglects the effects of a disclosure
threshold on both managerial behavior and real investment. Changes in expected activism
at t = 2 alter management incentives at t = 1, and both determine real investment at t = 0.
These, in turn, affect an activist’s opportunities and incentives to participate. A binding
disclosure threshold reduces the conditional trading transfers from investors to the activist.
However, this may incentivize real investment, creating a positive investment feedback that
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increases activist participation, thereby reducing managerial malfeasance. We next study
these tensions.
3.2 Optimal Policies
This section analyzes management and investment feedback effects and derives the optimal
blockholder disclosure threshold policies. We present our results in terms of the activism












Here, εm < 0 captures management reaction to the threat of activism: the larger is εm in
absolute value, the larger is the reduction in managerial malfeasance H(ρt) due to a marginal
increase in the conditional probability of activism G(ct). εa > 0 captures the responsiveness
of activism to informed trading: the larger is εa, the larger is the increment in activism
G(ct) associated with a marginal increase in expected trading profits ct. Absent a binding
disclosure threshold, when the activist participates he takes a position α∗ and earns ex-
pected gross profits c∗t , the manager adopts the bad business plan if her reputation cost is





t ) ≡ ε∗m and εa (c∗t , ρ∗t ) ≡ ε∗a.
Proposition 4 derives the consequences of disclosure thresholds by characterizing the or-
dering of the optimal threshold policies for investors, the activist and a welfare-maximizing
regulator representing society. We denote these policies αI , αA and αR respectively, and or-
der the policies as a function of the activism elasticity of management, ε∗m. We assume that
second-order conditions are well-behaved for investors and the activist; the Appendix shows
that they are well-behaved when the activist’s costs of intervention and the management’s
reputation costs have uniform distributions.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the net expected profits of investors and activists are quasicon-
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cave in α for α ≤ α∗. Then there exist cutoffs on the activism elasticity of management for
the activist ε∗Am , investors ε
∗I
m , and the regulator ε
∗R







1. If the activism elasticity of management is sufficiently high, then only the activist ben-
efits from a binding disclosure threshold: ε∗m < ε
∗A
m ⇒ 0 < αA < α∗ ≤ {αI , αR}.
2. If the activism elasticity of management is moderately high, then no one benefits from
a binding disclosure threshold: ε∗Am ≤ ε∗m ≤ ε∗Im ⇒ 0 < α∗ ≤ {αI , αA, αR} .
3. If the activism elasticity of management is moderately low, then only investors benefit
from a binding disclosure threshold: ε∗Im < ε
∗
m ≤ ε∗Rm ⇒ 0 < αI < α∗ ≤ {αA, αR} .
4. If the activism elasticity of management is low enough, then investors and society gain
from a binding disclosure threshold, but activists do not: ε∗Rm < ε
∗
m ⇒ 0 < αI < αR <
α∗ ≤ αA.
Figure 2 illustrates the results; a full proof with explicit solutions for the three cutoffs is
in the Appendix. Optimal disclosure threshold policies are characterized by the first-order
conditions (FOCs) of net profit functions with respect to the activist position α. Corollary 3
implies that when the optimal position is less than α∗, it can be achieved in equilibrium by
a binding disclosure threshold. The following subsections derive each of the optimal policies
and explain the underlying mechanisms.
αA < α
∗ ≤ {αI , αR}
ε∗Am
α∗ ≤ {αI , αR, αA}
ε∗Im
αI < α
∗ ≤ {αR, αA}
ε∗Rm
αI < αR < α
∗ ≤ αA
ε∗m 0
Figure 2: Optimal disclosure thresholds
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3.2.1 Uninformed Investors
Uninformed investors maximize πIf(k)− rk. The associated FOC reveals that they benefit
from a binding disclosure threshold if and only if
H(ρ∗t )λ
[







f(k) < 0, (15)
which can be rearranged to ε∗m > ε
∗I
m . That is, when (15) holds, the marginal profits to
investors from increasing the activist’s position when α = α∗ are negative. Then, investors
benefit from a disclosure threshold that limits their trading losses and, in turn, the probabil-
ity that the activist participates after observing malfeasance. The optimal policy is implicitly
characterized by the FOC, i.e., αI sets the left-hand side of (15) equal to zero. In the Ap-
pendix we show that αI > 0, i.e., investors always benefit from some degree of market opacity.
Investors benefit from managerial feedback, which is captured in (15) by the second term






< 0 captures the manager’s response to a
marginal increase in the profitability of activism. A large h implies a high activism elasticity
of management εm, i.e., a large reduction in malfeasance in response to an increase in the
conditional probability that the activist intervenes. Notably, this reduced managerial malfea-
sance reduces the relative value of activism ex-ante, increasing the share of the pie that unin-
formed investors obtain in expectation, i.e., ∂πI
∂H(ρ∗t )
f(k) < 0. Thus, increased managerial feed-
back raises the value of conditional trading transfers for uninformed investors, reducing the
desirability of disclosure thresholds. As a result, investors only gain from a binding threshold
if the activism elasticity of management is small enough (in absolute terms), i.e., if ε∗m > ε
∗I
m .
Importantly, a small activism elasticity of management is not sufficient to make a bind-
ing disclosure threshold desirable for uninformed investors, i.e., for αI < α
∗. To see this,
consider h→ 0, which eliminates managerial feedback: εm → 0. The FOC in (15) reveals:
Corollary 5 A necessary condition for uninformed investors to benefit from a binding thresh-
old is g(c∗t )(δf(k)− c∗t ) < G(c∗t ).
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Holding management behavior constant, g(c∗t ) (δf(k)− c∗t ) represents the marginal benefits
to uninformed investors of increasing trading transfers to the activist when α = α∗, i.e., for
c∗t . On the margin, higher transfers increase the probability that the activist participates
after observing managerial malfeasance by g (c∗t ). The net benefit for investors is the dif-
ference between the total value enhanced by the activist δf(k) and their trading losses c∗t .
Conversely, G(c∗t ) captures the conditional loss from marginally higher transfers: with this
probability the activist would have participated anyway, even if investors’ expected trading
transfers had not been increased. Hence, the conditional marginal profitability of activism
must be negative for investors to benefit from a binding disclosure threshold.





Trading transfers are the cost that investors incur in exchange for managerial discipline.
When a marginal increase in trading transfers c∗t has a small impact on the conditional prob-
ability G(c∗t ) that the activist intervenes—when the profit elasticity of activism ε
∗
a is small—
then investors gain from a binding disclosure threshold that limits both trading transfers
and activist intervention. Corollary 5 shows that this is a necessary condition for investors
to find a disclosure threshold desirable.
3.2.2 Activist Hedge Fund
The activist maximizes his expected gross revenues πAf(k) net of the expected cost of inter-
vention, i.e., net of H(ρt)λG(ct)E [c|c ≤ ct]. The Appendix shows that the activist benefits





c∗t − E [c|c ≤ c∗t ]
]
< 0, (17)








c∗t − E [c|c ≤ c∗t ]
]
< 0, hurts the ac-
tivist: well-behaving management destroys the raison d’être of activists. A larger position of
the activist yields higher trading profits ct, raising the conditional profitability of activism,
and the extent of activism upon managerial malfeasance G (ct). However, this, in turn, de-
ters managerial malfeasance, reducing the activist’s opportunity to profit, i.e., dH(ρt)
dct
< 0. As
a result, increasing a binding disclosure threshold, α, which increases trading profits, need
not increase the activist’s unconditional expected profits.
Proposition 4 shows that the activist benefits from a disclosure threshold if managerial
feedback is strong enough. When management’s behavior is sensitive to the threat of ac-
tivism, the activist gains from a disclosure threshold that effectively commits it to reducing
its intervention rates, thereby encouraging managerial malfeasance. Analysis of (17) reveals
that the activist can only benefit from a disclosure threshold due to managerial feedback.
This is not immediate. The activist also faces an investment feedback effect that he does
not internalize. In particular, his position at t = 2 influences initial investment k, and this
determines the trading profits from a given position α. Using (9) in the characterization of











∂α︸ ︷︷ ︸ .
investment feedback
(18)
Net trading transfers capture the effect of the activist’s position on transfers at t = 2 for a
given investment k; Proposition 1 shows that these transfers increase with α for α < α∗. The
investment feedback effect captures the impact of the activist’s position on real investment
∂k
∂α
, and hence on trading transfers ∂ct
∂k
. Real investment always raises trading transfers, and
thus the extent of activism, i.e., ∂ct
∂k
> 0. However, the activist’s position α might be large
enough to hurt investors, who respond by reducing investment. That is, if α > αI then
∂k
∂α
< 0, and the effect of a larger position on trading transfers is determined by the balance
of two opposing forces: positive net transfers and a negative investment feedback. Perhaps
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surprisingly, this tension is always resolved against the investment feedback effect:
Corollary 6 dct
dα
> 0 for α < α∗.
This result reflects the subordinated nature of investment feedback with respect to the
direct impact of trading transfers. Intuitively, these transfers lead the activist to take a posi-
tion α∗, which, in turn, affects investment. If the reduction in investment from increasing α
were strong enough to reduce the activist’s trading profits, i.e., if dct
dα
< 0, then it would also
increase investor profits because g(ct) [δf(k)− ct] < G(ct) when ∂k∂α < 0. But then investors
would increase investment, not reduce it, benefiting activists.
The characterization of ε∗Am in the Appendix reveals that the cutoff increases with ε
∗
a—the
higher is the profit elasticity of activism, the more the activist values a disclosure thresh-
old. When higher trading profits greatly increase the willingness to engage in activism, they
may also strongly deter managerial malfeasance. Then, the responsiveness ε∗a of the activist
to its potential trading profits harms it. In those circumstances, investors do not want a
binding disclosure threshold. This reflects that the activist’s gains from a binding disclosure
threshold are due to the increased managerial malfeasance that it causes, malfeasance that
destroys project value when the activist does not intervene, and generates trading losses for
investors when he does. But then, investors value the extensive discouragement effect of
potential activism on managerial malfeasance. In particular, when the marginal value to the
activist of tightening the disclosure threshold is positive, it is negative for investors; and vice
versa. Formally, ε∗Am < ε
∗I
m , implying that the activist and investors cannot benefit from a
disclosure threshold at the same time.
3.2.3 Society
Society maximizes total expected value πV f(k) net of the costs of capital rk and the ex-
pected costs of activism H(ρt)λG (ct)E[c|c ≤ ct]. Society gains from a disclosure threshold
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which can be rearranged to ε∗m > ε
∗R
m . The condition reveals that society cares about the
value-enhancing effects of activism and real investment; but not about transfers between
uninformed investors and the activist.
The first line of (19) is positive and captures the social impact of managerial feedback.
One can decompose this effect into two components by expanding ∂πI
∂H(ρ∗t )
and rearranging.
One component is the value enhanced by deterring malfeasance, δf(k) [1− λG(ct)]. Here,
δf(k) is the difference in firm value under good and bad business plans; and 1−λG(ct) is the
probability that the activist stops a bad plan when it is implemented. The other component
is the expected cost of disciplining management if the activist intervenes, λG(ct)E[c|c ≤ ct].
Deterring malfeasance means that those costs do not have to be incurred. A regulator wants
greater potential activism and hence weaker ownership disclosure when managers respond
by more to the threat of discipline, i.e., when the activism elasticity of management is large.
The benefits from managerial feedback reflect the deterrence of malfeasance via the threat
of activist intervention (ex ante disciplining). In addition, society, like uninformed investors,
benefits from actual interventions that change a bad business plan to a good one (ex post
disciplining). The second line of (19) captures this. The activist observes managerial malfea-
sance with probability H(ρt)λ, while g (ct) δf(k) is the conditional increase in the gross value
from intervention, and g (ct) ct is the associated increase in the expected cost of activism.
The third line in (19) represents investment feedback that is not internalized by investors.
More specifically, real investment solves πIf
′ (k)−r = 0, but the optimal investment for soci-
ety sets (πI +πA)f
′ (k)− r = 0. Society only benefits from a disclosure threshold if investors
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gain, but the converse is not true. For ε∗m > ε
∗R
m to hold, the investment feedback must
be negative, i.e., ∂k
∂α
< 0, implying that ε∗m > ε
∗I
m . Intuitively, society only cares about the
real economy, and not about secondary markets (trading transfers). The only social cost of
increasing managerial disciplining is the potential reduction in investment. If this is suffi-
ciently strong, then (19) holds and the regulator wants to set a binding disclosure threshold.
Still, this threshold always exceeds the optimal threshold from the perspective of investors
(αI < αR when αI < α
∗) who also care about trading transfers.
4 Stock-Picking
This section relaxes the assumption in our main setting that the activist can only take a
position in a target company after observing managerial malfeasance. Activist funds typi-
cally only intervene on a small fraction of their portfolio companies (Feng et al. 2020), and
recent empirical evidence suggests the significance of stock-picking, as opposed to activism,
for their profitability (Cremers et al. 2020; Feng et al. 2020). This leads us to investigate how
speculative trade by activist funds affects their engagement in mismanaged companies and,
in turn, managerial behavior, real investment, and optimal blockholder disclosure thresholds.
We now assume that, after the manager implements the good business plan (m = 1), the
activist can take a position in the company with probability θ < 1. Thus, θ = 0 corresponds
to our benchmark model. Parameter θ captures the informedness of the activist about under-
valued stocks of firms when intervention is unnecessary. Here, θ 6= λ allows for the distinct
visibility of bad and good business plans or different monitoring technologies of the activist.
Taking a position after observing the good business plan is profitable in expectation because
i) the activist has an information advantage, and ii) there is no need for costly intervention.
Thus, whenever the manager implements the good plan, the activist trades with probability θ
and does not intervene. Modifying the analysis in Section 2 under our new assumption yields:
Proposition 7 Managerial disciplining improves with the activist’s informedness about un-
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dervalued stocks. Better stock-picking θ reduces managerial malfeasance and raises the con-
ditional probability of activism.
Proposition 7 reveals a positive spillover effect of stock-picking by activist funds on man-
agerial disciplining. This effect is, to our knowledge, novel. The economic intuition is as
follows: Stock undervaluation occurs because market uncertainty pools together stocks with
good and bad plans. More stock-picking (discovery of good plans) leads to more trades
when plans are good, sometimes resulting in positive net order flows that reveal the ac-
tivist’s presence, and reducing the probability conditional on net sell order flow of a stock
with a good plan. In turn, this reduces the price of stocks when the net order flow is neg-
ative, making stock-picking more profitable. Because activism ‘transforms’ low-value stocks
into high-value, the same mechanism applies to activist targets, causing activism to become
more profitable. A proof is in the Appendix; here we develop the intuition.
All else equal, the probability that the activist trades on (positive) private information
increases with his information about undervalued stocks θ. Conditional on trading, his op-
timal position remains α∗ = 1/µ regardless of whether the activist intends to discipline
management or is stock-picking. From the market maker’s perspective, the better the ac-
tivist is at stock-picking, the more likely it is that a negative order flow ω ≤ 0 is associated
with value destruction by managerial malfeasance, i.e, where m = 0 and the activist does not
intervene. As a result, the associated stock price Pl decreases with θ, raising activist profits
from trading on its information advantage ct. In turn, this means that stock-picking makes
activism more profitable. In equilibrium, the conditional probability of activist interventions
G(c∗t ) rises with θ, which, in turn, reduces managerial malfeasance H(ρ
∗
t ).
This argument implies that conditional trading transfers c∗t increase with stock-picking
opportunities θ, despite both managerial and investment feedback effects. To see this, con-
sider managerial feedback and suppose that, to the contrary, the manager’s response to the
threat of activism (reduced malfeasance) was an offsetting force that raised the price set
by the market maker. This would reduce trading transfers, and hence the activist’s prof-
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its from intervention, and intervention rates themselves. Then the manager would increase
malfeasance, not reduce it, a contradiction. A similar argument applies to the response of
uninformed investors to an increase in trading transfers, i.e., to the investment feedback
effect analyzed in Section 3.2.2 and Corollary 6.
The impact of the activist’s stock-picking for uninformed investors is ambiguous. As in
the benchmark setting, investors face a tension between trading losses and managerial disci-
plining. Greater activist stock-picking improves managerial discipline, but it also raises in-
vestor trading losses when the activist takes a position. The dominating effect determines the
impact of stock-picking on real investment. With a high enough profit elasticity of activism
ε∗a and high managerial feedback (large ε
∗
m in absolute terms), uninformed investors benefit
from increased trading transfers and hence welcome the activist’s stock-picking. Then, the
optimal disclosure threshold for uninformed investors αI increases with θ. Instead, if the dis-
ciplining effect is offset by higher trading losses, investors prefer lower activist participation
rates and their optimal threshold falls with θ.
Consider the tension faced by the activist. He benefits from increased trading trans-
fers c∗t associated with stock-picking, but these transfers raise his own intervention rates
to discipline management and thus deter malfeasance. A similar argument is developed in
Section 3.2.2; here stock-picking makes it more subtle. In particular, note that deterrence
of managerial malfeasance translates to more stock-picking opportunities whenever θ > 0.
As a result, the activist may benefit from increased transfers in circumstances where, ab-
sent stock-picking, managerial feedback would make them unprofitable. It follows that when
θ is sufficiently large, or the managerial response is sufficiently small, the activist benefits
from increased stock-picking, which can only raise the optimal disclosure threshold for the
activist αA. Only when θ is sufficiently small and ε
∗
m is sufficiently large (in absolute terms)
can increased stock-picking make a lower disclosure threshold more desirable for the activist.
The social impact of activist stock-picking follows from the intuition developed in Section
3.2.3. Society is keener than investors about stock-picking because it benefits from increased
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managerial disciplining and it does not care about the associated higher trading transfers.
Thus, the only social cost of activist stock-picking is a potential reduction in real investment
caused by hurting uninformed investors. It follows that activist stock-picking benefits society
whenever it benefits uninformed investors, but the opposite is not true. Hence, stock-picking
contributes to misaligning the interests of uninformed investors and society, increasing the
distance between their optimal disclosure thresholds whenever they bind.
5 Discussion
Our model incorporates the main arguments of the debate about the desirability of revising
blockholder disclosure thresholds in the presence of activist funds. We now discuss how key
mechanisms revealed by our analysis provide a framework for policy evaluation.
Broadly, our model highlights the potential effects of changes in ownership disclosure
rules on managerial disciplining and capital formation. For instance, in 2017, then SEC
nominee R. Jackson called for an expansion of these rules for activist investors.6 Our anal-
ysis stresses the potentially negative impact on managerial disciplining while showing that
this might be socially desirable if it fosters real investment sufficiently by increasing investor
confidence. Alternatively, the SEC recently proposed to increase disclosure thresholds dras-
tically for asset managers, a measure that would conceal the positions of most activist funds
in the US. The comment letter to the SEC Bernhardt and Ordonez-Calafi (2020), based on
the analysis here, explained that the potential gains from managerial discipline were likely
outweighed by the loss associated with the reduction in market transparency.
Of course, policy evaluation based on our analysis should consider all the moving pieces.
Accordingly, recommendations point towards tailored disclosure policies that can account for
market and firm characteristics. For example, trading profits are directly related to market
liquidity and increased incentives for hedge fund activism. We show that high liquidity can
6See “Activist Investors’ Role Needs More Transparency, SEC Nominee Says”, The Wall Street Journal,
December 18, 2017.
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lead the costs of adverse selection in financial markets to outweigh the benefits of manage-
rial disciplining, thereby reducing the optimal threshold, while the opposite happens when
liquidity is low. Empirical studies that find a positive relation between liquidity and hedge
fund activism generally include industry controls (e.g., Edmans et al. 2013; Norli et al. 2015;
Gantchev et al. 2019), which, coupled with our results, suggests the potential desirability of
industry-specific thresholds based on liquidity measures.
Whether activists’ trading profits are excessive or insufficient from a regulator’s perspec-
tive hinges on their costs of engaging management. These costs likely rise with managerial
entrenchment and thus with regulation that insulates management from shareholder pressure.
Our analysis suggests that a positive relationship between management-friendly regulation
(e.g., business judgement rule) and the level of disclosure thresholds is desirable. Notably
the extent to which regulation protects or exposes management may depend on the nature of
activist demands. For instance, US takeover regulation is relatively permissive with takeover
defences (Armour and Skeel 2007), raising the cost of interventions that advocate the sale of
a target company. The optimal threshold for takeover-seeking campaigns may therefore ex-
ceed those involving interventions on aspects in which management is legally more exposed.
Many countries already require a statement of purpose with the disclosure of ownership (e.g.,
in 13Ds); our analysis suggests potential benefits of activism objective-specific thresholds.
Brav et al. (2010) provide a classification of these objectives.
An important consideration for ownership disclosure rules is target firm size or market
capitalization. Some activist funds take positions that do not cross disclosure thresholds;
recent studies point to capital costs and financial constraints as key reasons (Becht et al.
2017; Brav et al. 2019). Our setting provides insights into the differential impact of a unique
threshold on companies of distinct sizes. Relatively high returns of activism on large compa-
nies may make their thresholds too high. With a small profit elasticity of activism, reducing
disclosure thresholds can alleviate market adverse selection while maintaining the disciplin-
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ing benefits of hedge fund activism. The opposite applies to smaller companies.7 Market
capitalization-contingent thresholds, or a combination of dollar and percentage value thresh-
olds, could account for the impacts of firm size heterogeneity—see Edmans and Holderness
(2017) for further arguments on the merits of dollar-ownership measures.
Our main modelling assumptions are motivated by findings in the empirical literature,
and, as our introduction highlights, many of our model predictions have empirical support.
However, regulators and academics may want to investigate the more nuanced mechanisms
in our model—involving the activism elasticity of management and the profit elasticity of
activism—to better understand the effects of policy changes. Gantchev et al. (2019) develop
an empirical framework to study the responsiveness of management to the threat of activism.
Their measures of changes in the probability of companies being targeted by activist funds
may be suitable for an empirical analysis of our setting. Testing the responsiveness of ac-
tivism to increases in trading profits likely requires indirect proxies. One possibility is to
exploit variation in the liquidity of stock in target companies. Our model predicts a positive
relationship between target stock liquidity and activist trading profits and, indeed, Edmans
et al. (2013) find that activism is positively associated with liquidity. Alternatively, one may
be able to exploit changes in disclosure thresholds or the heterogeneity of thresholds across
financial jurisdictions to test the responsiveness of activism to trading profits.8
6 Concluding Remarks
Hedge fund activism has generated debate about the desirability of revising blockholder dis-
closure thresholds. These rules were set to protect small investors from abusive tactics of
7A potential spillover effect of setting low disclosure thresholds is to create incentives for activist funds to
diversify their portfolios. In particular, when trading profits obtained from targeting one company are limited
by the disclosure threshold, an even lower threshold may lead activists to seek new investment opportunities
for the capital that, with a higher threshold, would have been invested in a single company (we thank the ref-
eree for this insight). A pecking order argument suggests that these new projects are typically less profitable.
8Blockholder disclosure thresholds differ across financial systems. For example, investors that intend to
introduce corporate changes in US publicly-listed companies must fill a 13(d) file when their holdings reach
5% of voting rights. In Canada, disclosure is not required until a 10% stake is acquired. In the EU, Germany
recently reduced the threshold to the 3% cutoff used in the UK, while the threshold in France remains at 5%.
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blockholders. We identify the tradeoffs. Disclosure thresholds may discourage activist funds
from intervening to protect small investors from corporate managers who take actions that
benefit themselves at the expense of firm value; but activist funds are also informed traders
who profit from trading on their information advantage about their value-enhancing actions
at the expense of uninformed investors. While managerial discipline creates value and in-
centivizes real investment, the associated trading rents extracted from uninformed investors
reduce their profitability and impair investment, destroying value.
We show that the preferences for binding disclosure thresholds of investors, activist funds
and society are never aligned. When investors gain from a binding threshold, they benefit
more than regulators, and activists are necessarily harmed even though, in this instance,
the threshold causes investors to increase investment. Activists can gain from a disclosure
threshold because it acts as a commitment device to intervene less frequently. We prove that
activists can gain from such commitment when it encourages managerial malfeasance, but
not because it fosters real investment. Thus, activists gain only when investors and society
are harmed. The threat of activism disciplines managers and raises investment value with
no effective cost of intervention, benefiting society. We only find scope for agreement when
all market participants gain from non-binding disclosure thresholds. This requires that the
willingness of activists to intervene be sufficiently sensitive to the degree of market opacity,
but, in turn, that firm management not be too sensitive to the threat of activism in its
choices of whether to take actions that benefit itself at the expense of shareholders.
Our analysis provides insights for policy makers. We characterize how optimal disclosure
rules that target activist investors (e.g., 13D filings in the US) hinge on multiple factors
that differ across firms, suggesting that a tailored approach is desirable. Our model links
the desirability of disclosure thresholds to market fundamentals (e.g., liquidity), firm char-
acteristics (e.g., market capitalization and managerial entrenchment) and the regulatory
framework (e.g., cost of activism). The mechanisms revealed can help regulators setting
thresholds contingent on these characteristics.
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7 Appendix: Proofs
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Market maker. Let α̂ be the market maker’s conjecture about the activist’s trade, which
is correct in equilibrium. Let ĉt ≡ ct (α̂) be the analogous conjecture about his cost par-
ticipation threshold. The market maker observes ω. Given ω, either (i) the activist did
not take a position and l = −ω; or (ii) the activist participates and l = −ω + α̂. From
our assumptions it follows that the unconditional probability that the activist does not par-
ticipate is [1 − zλG(ĉt)]y(−ω), and the unconditional probability that he participates is
zλG (ĉt) y(−ω + α̂). Thus, the expected project value is
E[V |ω] =
[
y(−ω)(1− z) + y(−ω + α̂)zλG (ĉt)






y(−ω)(1− z) + y(−ω + α̂)zλG (ĉt) + y(−ω)z[1− λG (ĉt)]
]
(1− δ)f(k).
Suppose the market maker observes ω > 0. Then y(−ω) = 0, and the activist participates
with certainty so P (ω) = Ph. If, instead, ω ≤ 0, the market maker does not know whether
the activist participates, with y(−ω + α̂) = µeµ(ω−α̂) and y(−ω) = µeµω. The term µeµω
cancels out of the numerator and denominator of (20). Using Y (α) = 1− e−µα yields (6).
Activist. The activist’s position α∗ = 1/µ is derived in the main text, and the market
maker’s conjecture is correct in equilibrium, i.e., α̂ = α∗.
7.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Gross expected profits. Consider an arbitrary position α. The unconditional project value
E[V ] in Proposition 2 weighs cash flows f(k) with the probabilities that (i) the manager im-
plements the good business plan, 1−H(ρt); (ii) the manager implements the bad plan but
is disciplined by the activist, H(ρt)λG(ct); (iii) the manager implements the bad plan and
33
is not disciplined by the activist but the project succeeds anyway, H(ρt)[1− λG(ct)](1− δ).
The activist’s gross profits are obtained by weighting his conditional profits E[ΠA|α] with
the probability of participation H(ρt)λG(ct),
E[ΠA] = πAf(k)










By construction, expected investors’ profits are the residual E[ΠI ] = [πV − πA] f(k),
E[ΠI ] = πIf(k)











Proposition 2 provides expressions for expected profits in equilibrium, substituting α =
α∗ = 1/µ. Rearranging πA as a function of ct shows that α affects expected profits only
through trading transfers ct and capital, i.e., E[ΠA](ct(α), k(α)) and E[ΠI ](ct(α), k(α)).
Real Investment. The first-order condition for investors’ net profits πIf(k) − rk charac-
terizes real investment. Note that while πI is a function of both activism and investment,
small investors are price takers who do not internalize the effects of their own investment.
7.3 Proof of Proposition 4
The proof first studies partial impacts of α and k on trading transfers ct; then it uses the
results to derive critical cutoffs {εIm, εAm, εRm}. The proof follows with a comparison of the
cutoffs. Last, the proof shows that second order conditions hold when the costs of activism
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and management reputation costs are uniformly distributed.
7.3.1 Partial effects on trading transfers
The characterization of ct is obtained from using z ≡ H(ρt) in (8). Plugging in ρt as given








. Here we show ∂ct
∂α
> 0 for α ≤ α∗ and ∂ct
∂k
> 0.














































= −H(ρt)[1− λG(ct)]δf(k)× (24)
×
(














< 0 and therefore ∂F
∂ct
> 0. Derivation in (24) expands Y (α) = 1− e−µα, and
the expression reveals that ∂F
∂α




Investors. Investor net expected profits are πIf(k)− rk, with πI given by (22). To derive
their optimal disclosure threshold, we differentiate with respect to α. Using z ≡ H(ρt) with
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′ (k)− r] ∂k
∂α
. (26)
Two features simplify the analysis of (26). First, Proposition 2 shows that in equilibrium
πIf
′(k) − r = 0, so the last term in (26) vanishes. Second, the activist position that max-
imizes investor profits also maximizes investment, so any interior maximum of πIf(k) − rk
satisfies ∂k
∂α














f(k) = 0. Section 7.3.1 shows that ∂ct
∂α
> 0 for α ≤ α∗.
Hence, if there is an interior maximum αI < α






























At α = 0, activist trading profits are zero, so ct = 0, and hence (27) > 0 and (26) > 0:
investors always value some market opacity, i.e., αI > 0. To characterize ε
I
m, rearrange




















































































Activist. Net expected activist profits are:
πAf(k)−H(ρt)λG(ct)E [c|c ≤ ct] = H(ρt)λG (ct) [ct − E [c|c ≤ ct]] , (31)
where the right-hand side uses the solution for πA in Proposition 2. Here, H(ρt)λG(ct)
is the unconditional probability that the activist participates. Conditional on intervention,
expected profits are the difference between trading profits ct and the cost of disciplining man-





/G (ct). Differentiating yields
d
dα












The result follows because
dE [c|c ≤ ct]
dα
=























[ct − E [c|c ≤ ct]]
dct
dα






= g (ct) ct.
The sign of (32) is determined by the product of the term in big brackets and dct
dα
; in what
follows we prove by contradiction that dct
dα











> 0 for α ≤ α∗ and ∂ct
∂k
> 0. If dct
dα
< 0, the activist gains from a disclosure threshold due






< 0 to hold,
a marginal increase in the activist’s position must hurt investors, implying that ∂πI
∂ct
< 0.




and thus that dct
dα
< 0. By




But this higher profitability leads investors to increase capital when the activist increases
his position ∂k
∂α
> 0, a contradiction. It follows that dct
dα
> 0 for α < α∗ and the sign of (32)
is determined by the term in big brackets.
We set (32) = 0 to derive εAm. Using
dct
dα










, plugging in the expressions for εa and εm, and dividing by H(ρt),
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yields the following condition equivalent to (34):













[ct − E [c|c ≤ ct]]
= 1 + εmεa
[










c∗t − E [c|c ≤ c∗t ]
)
. (36)
Regulator. The regulator maximizes
πV f(k)− rk −H(ρt)λG(ct)E [c|c ≤ ct] , (37)
where πV is given in Proposition 2. Differentiating with respect to α yields:
d
dα














λG (ct)E [c|c ≤ ct]
dct
dα










where the last term incorporates the expression derived in (33). Substitute the equilibrium
relationships πIf
′ (k)− r = 0 and πV = πI + πA to rearrange (38). The regulator’s marginal
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payoff from increasing α can be represented as:
d
dα












λG (ct)E [c|c ≤ ct]
dct
dα






δf(k) [1− λG (ct)] + λG (ct)E [c|c ≤ ct]
]dct
dα






















where the second equality follows from dπV
dct
= H (ρt) δλg (ct)− dH(ρt)dct δ [1− λG (ct)].
The last equality of (39) corresponds to the characterization in (19). Consider this ex-
pression and define Ψ ≡ − ∂πV
∂H(ρt)
f(k) + λG (ct)E [c|c ≤ ct] to ease exposition: the second
term in the big brackets becomes dH(ρt)
dct


























































































































To see εAm < ε
I



























[1− λG (ct)]δ + λG (ct) ctf(k)
] ∈ (0, 1), (44)
whereas ct
ct−E[c|c≤ct] > 1. From (44) it also follows that the right-hand side of (43) is positive.
To see εIm < ε
R
m, note that a necessary condition for ε
R




implies that investors’ marginal profits decrease and thus εIm < εm. Hence, if ε
R
m = 0, then
εIm < εm < 0. Thus, for ε
R
m < εm, it is necessary, but not sufficient, that ε
I
m < εm.
7.3.4 The uniform-uniform case
We show that when both c and ρ are uniformly distributed, second-order conditions hold.
Investors. We rewrite the first-order condition (FOC) in (28), first substituting in the uni-
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form distribution of the manager’s reputation cost, and then the uniform distribution of the










































f(k) and then by 1
g(ct)
yields equivalent conditions










































We prove that there is a unique solution to the investors’ FOC by showing that the



















where the second line uses G(ct) = ct/C for ct ≤ C. Note that (48) is negative for ct → 0
and increasing in ct. We derive an upper bound for ct and show that
d
dct
RHS(47) < 0 for
such trading transfers, establishing that the solution to the FOC in (47) is unique.
Trading transfers decrease with the probability Y (α) that the market maker detects the
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activist, so an upper bound of ct is obtained by setting Y (α) = 0. Moreover (23)-(24) reveal
that with Y (α) = 0, trading transfers are maximized by α = 1
µ(1−H(ρt)λG(ct)) . Using the char-





























The second line expands H(ρt) in the numerator using its uniform distribution and the char-











Substituting (50) into the second line of (48) reveals that a sufficient condition for d
dct
RHS(47) <
0 is µ > ϕ
R
. The condition is satisfied by assumptions µ > 1 and ϕ < R.





















[ct − E [c|c ≤ ct]] . (51)






















and note that ct − E [c|c ≤ ct] = ct2 . It follows that the
activist’s FOC satisfies







The right-hand side of (53) decreases in ct, implying a unique solution.
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7.4 Proof of Proposition 7
First we modify the analysis of Section 2 to account for the new assumption that the activist
can trade over positive information m = 1 with probability θ. Then we conduct comparative
statics with respect to θ.
7.4.1 Trading
Market maker. Given the market maker’s conjecture about the activist’s trade α̂, which
is correct in equilibrium, the unconditional probability that the activist does not participate
is
[
1− zλG(ĉt)− (1− z)θ
]
y(−ω), and the unconditional probability that he participates is[
zλG(ĉt) + (1− z)θ
]
y(−ω + α̂). Thus, the expected project value is
E[V |ω] =
[
y(−ω)(1− z)(1− θ) + y(−ω + α̂)
[
zλG (ĉt) + (1− z)θ
]
y(−ω)(1− z)(1− θ) + y(−ω + α̂)
[
zλG (ĉt) + (1− z)θ
]






y(−ω)(1− z)(1− θ) + y(−ω + α̂)
[
zλG (ĉt) + (1− z)θ
]
+ y(−ω)z[1− λG (ĉt)]
]
(1− δ)f(k).
If ω > 0, then y(−ω) = 0 and the activist participates with certainty so P (ω) = f(k) ≡
Ph. If ω ≤ 0, then y(−ω + α̂) = µeµ(ω−α̂) and y(−ω) = µeµω. Algebra and the use of





zλG(ct) + (1− z)θ
]
Y (α)− z(1− λG(ct))δ
1−
[





In particular, the price (55) is smaller than the price (6) in our benchmark setting.
Activist. The activist’s position remains unchanged with respect to the benchmark setting,
α∗ = 1/µ, and the market maker’s conjecture is correct in equilibrium, i.e., α̂ = α∗.
Equilibrium. At t = 2 real investment k is sunk and observable, and the manager adopted
m = 0 with probability z and m = 1 with residual probability. The activist takes a posi-
tion α∗ = 1/µ if either (a) he observes the good business plan (m = 1), or (b) he observes
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managerial malfeasance (m = 0) and the cost of activism is sufficiently small, c ≤ c∗t , where












and disciplines management in situation (b). Otherwise, the activist does not participate.
















f(k) if ω ≤ 0
Ph ≡ f(k) if ω > 0
. (57)
7.4.2 Management
The analysis of management behavior is equivalent to Section 2.1.2.
7.4.3 Investment
The expected value of the project at t = 0 given investment k, E[ΠV ], is characterized by





t ) + (1−H(ρ∗t ))θ
] c∗t
f(k)
f(k) ≡ πAf(k). (58)
The expected gross profits of uninformed investors E[ΠI ] and investment k are characterized
respectively by (12) and the solution to the FOC in (13).
7.4.4 Comparative Statics










feedback is integrated in the derivations. Here we prove ∂ct
∂θ










consider comparative statics analogous to those in Section 7.3.1. Define func-
tion F θ
∆









δf(k) from the expression of
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ct under the stock-picking assumption. Partial differentiation yields:
∂F θ
∂ct
= 1− [1− Y (α)]αδf(k)× (59)
×






















> 0 and ∂F
θ
∂θ
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